The C p selection criterion is a popular method to choose the smoothing parameter in spline regression. Another widely used method is the generalized maximum likelihood (GML) derived from a normal-theory empirical Bayes framework. These two seemingly unrelated methods, have been shown in Efron (Ann. Statist. 29 (2001) 470) and Kou and Efron (J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 97 (2002) 766) to be actually closely connected. Because of this close relationship, the current paper studies whether C p could also have an empirical Bayes interpretation for smoothing splines as GML does. It is shown that this is not possible. In addition, necessary conditions for a selection criterion to have an empirical Bayes interpretation are given, using which it is shown that a large class of selection criteria, including Akaike information criterion, Bayesian information criterion and Stein's unbiased risk estimate, does not possess an empirical Bayes explanation.
Introduction
Model selection is an important problem in statistics. This paper concerns a particular form of model selection: choosing the smoothing parameter in spline regression. The C p selection criterion (Mallows, 1973 ) is a popular method to choose the smoothing parameter (see, for example, Li, 1986 Li, , 1987 Hastie and Tibshirani, 1990; Wahba, 1990) . Another widely used method is the generalized maximum likelihood (GML) (Wecker and Ansley, 1983; Wahba, 1985; Stein, 1990) . These two criteria, from the surface, seem quite di erent from each other: C p chooses the smoothing parameter by minimizing an unbiased estimate of the prediction error, while GML is motivated from an empirical Bayes framework. However it is shown in Efron (2001) and subsequently studied in Kou and Efron (2002) that both GML and C p are actually maximum likelihood estimates with respect to two closely related curved exponential families.
With the close link between C p and GML being delineated, a question arises naturally: since GML is an empirical Bayes estimate, is that possible that C p also has some empirical Bayes interpretation? Such an empirical Bayes explanation, if found, may provide further understanding of the C p criterion. For example, it is well known that although the C p criterion asymptotically works well under the frequentist setting (see, for example, Li, 1986 Li, , 1987 Wahba, 1985; Kou, 2003) , ÿnite-sample wise it has the tendency of undersmoothing in that C p occasionally selects a very wiggly curve even when the true underlying curve is known to be smooth (see, for example, Hurvich et al., 1998) . If a Bayesian interpretation for C p is available, then by looking at the prior distribution (of the underlying regression curve), one may be able to see directly why such a phenomenon is present for C p -for instance, if the prior puts a lot of weights on wiggly curves, it would be the case. Furthermore, obtaining a Bayesian interpretation also o ers the potential to improve the C p criterion-one might be able to modify or remedy the prior distribution so as to obtain a selection criterion that has stable performance both asymptotically and ÿnite-sample wise.
The current paper investigates this possibility and shows that such an empirical Bayes explanation, unfortunately, is not possible, mainly due to the singularity of the C p density (a function introduced in Section 2) at zero. In addition, we give necessary conditions for any selection criterion to have an empirical Bayes interpretation, under both Gaussian and non-Gaussian noise. Employing these necessary conditions, we show that a large class of selection criteria, which includes Akaike information criterion (AIC), Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and Stein's unbiased risk estimate (SURE), does not possess empirical Bayes explanation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2, after reviewing spline regression and the C p and GML selection criteria, presents the main result, proving the impossibility of C p 's having an empirical Bayes interpretation, as well as giving necessary conditions for a selection criterion to have empirical Bayes explanation. Section 3 extends the result to non-Gaussian case. All the proofs are deferred to the appendix.
Main results

Spline regression and the C p and GML selection criteria
Suppose we have paired observations, {(x i ; y i ); i = 1; 2; : : : ; n} and want to estimate f(x) = E(y|x), the regression function of y on x. A linear smoother (Buja et al., 1989) estimates f = (f(x 1 ); f(x 2 ); : : : ; f(x n )) , the value of f(x) at the design points, byf = A y, where the entries of the n × n smoothing matrix A depend on x = (x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x n ) and also on a nonnegative smoothing parameter . One class of linear smoothers that will be of particular interest in this paper is spline regression, in which case the class of smoothing matrices {A ; 0 ¡ ¡ ∞} has the form
with U an n × n orthogonal matrix not depending on the smoothing parameter , and a = diag(a i ), a diagonal matrix with ith diagonal element a i = 1=(1 + k i ); i = 1; 2; : : : ; n; (2.2) the constants k = (k 1 ; k 2 ; : : : ; k n ), solely determined by x, being nonnegative and nondecreasing. (The cubic smoothing splinesf = arg min f
2 dt are a special case of (2.1) and (2.2); see Green and Silverman, 1994, Chapter 2.) To use spline regression in practice, one typically has to infer the value of the smoothing parameter from the data. The C p criterion chooses to minimize an unbiased estimate of total squared-error risk. Suppose that the y i are uncorrelated, with mean f i and constant variance 2 . Then the C p estimate of isˆ Cp =arg min {C (y)} where the
is an unbiased estimate of E f − f 2 , the squared prediction error. The notation C (y) assumes that x is ÿxed (as usual in regression problems), and that 2 is known. GML, the Generalized Maximum Likelihood criterion (Wecker and Ansley, 1983) , has a normal-theory empirical Bayes motivation. If one strengthens the likelihood to y ∼ N(f; 2 I ), and puts a Gaussian prior on the underlying curve:
3)
The second relationship shows thatf = A y is the Bayes estimate of f under squared error loss. The ÿrst relationship motivates the GML choice for the smoothing parameter:ˆ GML is the maximum likelihood estimate of based on y ∼ N(0; 2 (I − A ) −1 ). The setting of spline regression (2.1) allows a rotation of coordinates for the model y ∼ (f; 2 I ),
putting the smoother familyf = A y into diagonal form: z ∼ (g; I);ĝ = a z. Let b i = 1 − a i , b = (b 1 ; b 2 ; : : : ; b n ). In the new coordinate system, the C p statistic can be expressed as a function of z
By deÿning w = z 2 = (z 
Because of the e cacy of using z and g in obtaining simpler expressions, we will be working on them instead of y and f whenever possible. Comparing (2.5) with (2.7) gives an interesting observation: despite the di erent motivations of C p and GML, they have similar forms. In addition, if one replaces the GML marginal density (2.8) by a density having the form
where h(·) is a function not depending on , then the MLE of (2.9) leads to the C p criterion (2.5). Density (2.9), interestingly, forms an exponential family just as (2.8) does, which means that it can be written as d Cp (w) = exp(Á w − )h(w), where Á = −Cb 2 is the natural parameter vector and = −2C i b i is the cumulant generating function, which, furthermore, implies that h(·) is inverse Gaussian:
due to the one-to-one correspondence between a density and its cumulant generating function. ('(·) in (2.10) is the standard normal density.)
C p and empirical Bayes
The Bayesian framework (2.3), or equivalently (2.6), provides the empirical Bayes motivation of GML. The similarity between (2.5) and (2.7)-(2.9) naturally raises one question: Can C p also be interpreted from an empirical Bayes point of view? Such an interpretation, if found, will further our understanding of C p in that the prior distribution (of the underlying curve) not only directly points out C p 's strength and weakness, but also o ers the potential to improve it.
However we will show that this is not possible. In other words, there does not exist a prior distribution (·) on the curve g such that the Bayesian structure g ∼ (g); z|g ∼ N(g; I)
would give w = z 2 the marginal distribution w = z 2 ∼ d Cp (w), where d Cp (w) is given by (2.9) and (2.10). For convenience we will call d Cp (w) the C p density.
To show the nonexistence of the prior, we ÿrst note that the independence of w i in d Cp (w) and the independence structure in the likelihood z|g ∼ N(g; I) make it su cient to consider only the one-dimensional case-one only needs to show that no density function (·) fulÿlls these two requirements:
Theorem 2.1. A proper prior (·) on g that satisÿes both (i) and (ii) does not exist.
The proof of the theorem, shown by contradiction, is deferred to the appendix. The basic idea is that the C p density has a singularity at zero (d Cp (w) → 0, as w → 0), making it impossible to be the marginal density from any prior distribution on the curve g.
At this point, with the hope of C p 's having an empirical Bayes interpretation being rejected, one might wonder: What kind of criterion, then, could have such an explanation? The following theorem generalizes the result of Theorem 2.1, supplying a simple way to check whether a given distribution could be the marginal distribution of z from some prior.
Theorem 2.2. In order for a density function p(z) to be the marginal density of z from a proper prior with likelihood z|g ∼ N(g; 1), it must satisfy (a) lim z→0 p(z) ¿ 0; and (b) p(z) is inÿnitely di erentiable at z = 0.
Proof. See the appendix.
AIC, BIC and SURE, besides C p , are three widely used selection criteria. Since C p cannot be interpreted from an empirical Bayes angle, it is interesting to ask if AIC, BIC or SURE can be viewed as an empirical Bayes method. In the context of linear smoothers, it can be shown (Efron, 1986 ) that C p is identical to AIC and SURE. The BIC chooses the smoothing parameter according tô BIC = arg min { y −f 2 + 2 (log n) tr(A )};
where n is the sample size. To incorporate both AIC (thus C p and SURE) and BIC in a uniÿed framework, we consider a class of selection criteriâ
Taking the constant D = 2 in (2.11) gives AIC (C p and SURE), whereas taking D = log n results in BIC. Under the coordinate system of z and g, (2.11) is equivalent toˆ (D) = arg min i (b 2 i w i − Db i ), which, similar to the case of C p , gives the corresponding density function
Like the C p density, (2.12) is an exponential family, whose cumulant generating function determines h (D) to be inverse Gaussian:
Combining (2.12) with (2.13), we note that lim w→0 d (D) (w)=0. Applying Theorem 2.2, we conclude that entire class (2.11), which includes the popular C p , AIC, BIC and SURE, cannot be interpreted from an empirical Bayes point of view. This, in certain sense, indicates that the gap between C p and empirical Bayes is not small.
Extension to non-Gaussian case
We have been working on the normal likelihood z|g ∼ N(g; I) in the previous section. This section extends our investigation to study whether the results hold if we change the normal assumption to z|g = g + ; where = ( 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n ) and the i are i.i.d. according to some distribution that has zero mean. It turns out that the previous results are qualitatively correct-C p still cannot have an empirical Bayes explanation even under non-Gaussian case.
Let f(·) denote the density function of i . Again it su ces to consider only the one-dimensional case. The following theorem extends the C p result of Theorem 2.1 to non-Gaussian situation.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose the density function f(·) is bounded from above (e.g. normal density, t density, gamma density, etc.). Then there does not exist a proper prior (·) on g that satisÿes
The proof is deferred to the appendix, which still hinges on the singularity of the C p density at zero. Complementing Theorem 2.1, we give the necessary condition for a selection criterion to have empirical Bayes interpretation for the non-Gaussian case.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose z|g = g + , where has bounded density function f(·). Then in order for a given distribution to be the marginal distribution of z from some prior, its density function p(z) must satisfy lim z→0 p(z) ¿ 0.
As we have seen for the selection criteria (2.11) lim w→0 d (D) (w) = 0, it follows from Theorem 3.2 that they, including AIC, BIC and SURE, do not have empirical Bayes interpretation even under non-Gaussian noise.
where as before '(·) is the standard normal density. Since
Cp (w), simple algebra after rearranging its terms gives The proof is completed by noting the clear con ict between (A.2) and (A.3).
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Let (g) denote the prior for g. Then we must have
Rearranging the terms yields Letting w → 0, the limit of the left-hand side is positive, while the right-hand side goes to 0. This contradiction concludes the proof.
The proof of Theorem 3.2 is almost identical to that of Theorem 3.1, and is hence omitted.
